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In the Supretne Court of the 
State of Utah 
LAMAR H. CARLSON and 
BE'ITY M. CARLSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
W. L. HAMILTON and 
ESTELLA HAMILTON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 8634 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October, 1952, the plaintiffs and defendants entered 
into a real estate contract for the purchase of land and 
personal property consisting of machinery and water stock. 
That the :plaintiffs agreed to pay the defendants for the 
purchase of said property $22,000.00, with a down payment 
of $5,000.00 and payments of $1,000.00 a year commencing 
on January 1, 1954, and each year thereafter until the bal-
ance of the purchase price together with interest was paid 
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). That the plaintiffs received pos-
session of the property- in March, 1953, and immediately 
-placed a tenant thereon. The contract also contained the 
provision that upon failure to make any payments when 
the same shall become due, the seller shall, as his option, be 
released from all obligations in law and equity to convey 
said property, and ·all payments which have been made 
theretofore on this contract by the buyer shall be forfeited 
to the seller as liquidated damages for the non-performance 
of the contract, and the buyer agrees that the seller may, 
as ·his option, re-enter and take possession of said premises -
without legal process (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). That the said 
plaintiffs made the payment of January 1, 1954, consisting 
of $1,000.00 payment on the purchase price and $680.00 
interest (Tr. 6). That the payment due on January 1, 1~, 
of $1,000.00 on the principal and $640.00 interest was- not 
paid (Tr. 9). On the 20th day of December, 1954, one of 
the pl~tiffs herein, Lamar Carlson, came to the home of 
the defendants herein and told them that he could not make 
the payments. The defendant, W. L. Hamilton, told Mr. 
Carlson that if he would pay the back taxes, water assess-
ment and pay the interest that Mr. Hamilton would forget 
the principal for the time being. Thereafter Mr. Hamilton 
went to Salt Lake City in January, 1955, and saw Mr. Carl-
son again, who informed Mr. Hamilton that he couldn't 
make payments and would have to let the place go back 
(Tr. 85). Thereafter, son1etime in January or February 
of 1955, Mr. Hamilton sent an unsie,oned notice through the 
mail to Mr. Carlson, informing him that he had placed 
no trespass signs around the fann. That at that time Mr. 
Carlson had no tenant on the farm nor anybody else to 
look after it. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed suit against the 
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defendants .for money had and received, alleging that the 
contract's forfeiture clause be declared a penalty clause 
and return the money paid to the defendants back to the 
plaintiffs. The defendants denied the plaintiffs' allegations 
and asked the court to .construe the forfeiture clause as 
being liquidated damages and dismissing the plaintiffs' 
claim. The defendants ·counterclaimed for their damages 
herein. Trial was held on the 30tn day of July, 1956, at 
which time the court awarded the plaintiffs judgment. 
STATEMENT OY POINTS 
POINT 1:-f/ , ~ 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND 
CONSTRUING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS· BEING-
"--- .. . . _. 
A PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
POINTlt 
THAT THE_ COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING--
DEFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT _1 
THAT TH·E COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND 
CONSTR;UING THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AS BEING 
~ PENALTY INSTEAD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
That the plaintiff to recover in this suit must show that 
the ·forfeiture in said contract was a pen·alty and not for 
liquidated damages. The plaintiff having the burden of 
proof. 
The plaintiffs purchased from the defendants, farm 
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land, house, machinery and a water right. The purchase 
price was. $22,000.00·, with $5,000.00 as a down payment. 
The payments on the balance of the. purchase price were 
to be $1,000.00 a year, together with interest as sown on 
the· contract. One payment of $1,000.00, together with 
interest in the sum of $680.00, was paid; that thereafter 
the plaintiffs defaulted in their payments, as well as be-
coming delinquent in taxes, water as....~ents and insur-
ance, which were part of the contract. The plaintiffs re-
ceived possession of the -property in March, 1953, although 
the contract was executed in October, 1952. The plain-
tiffs immediately placed a tenant upon the property to look 
after it. 
The first well recognized principle of law that we are 
faced with is that equity abhors a forfeiture, and the law 
does not favor it. Therefore, the nem step in deciding 
whether the forfeiture clause in the contract was a penalty 
or liquidated damages are the cases decided in Utah, and 
the Court ·has stated on occasion that each case should be 
decided on its own facts. That no hard, fast rules can be 
laid down. 
That on the problem in front of us the American La\v 
Report, Annotated, 6 ALR 2d, at page 1403, has this to 
say: 
"The ultimate questions dependent upon a d~ter­
mination of whether a particular contractual provision 
is to be regarded as one for liquidated damages, on the 
one hand, or as one for a pellalty, on the other, are 
many and various. If the clause is one for a penalty 
it may, if oppressive or unconscionable, be considered 
Wlenforceable, with the result that the defaulting party 
is liaJble for the actual damages suffered by the other 
party, whether they are more or less than the sum 
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mentioned in the stipulation. On the other hand, a 
provision for liquidated damages is normally consid-
ered valid and enforceable, with the result that the 
sum mentioned may ~be recovered upon a ·breach of the 
agreement even if it exceeds the amount of the actual 
damages suffered.'' 
With the above principal in mind, I shall now take up 
the two Utah cases which have been decided, as follows: 
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P 2d 446, and Cole vs. Parker, 300 
p· 2d 623. 
In the Perkins vs. Spencer case, the Court said: 
"It will be observed that in all cases where the stipu-
lation for liqudated damages was enforced it bore some 
reasonable relation to the actual damages which. could 
reasonably be anticipated at the time the contract was 
made and was not a forfeiture which would allow an 
UllConscionahle and exhorbitant recovery.'' 
In the Cole vs. Parker case, the Court said: 
"In the absence of fraud or imposition to parties to a 
contract are boWld by the price or value that they have 
agreed on and such price must be paid notwithstanding 
it may be excessive." 
Restatement of Contracts Rule 339 has this on the 
problem: 
"An agreement made in advance of breach fixing the 
damages therefore is not enforcealble as a COfl!tract and 
does not affect the damages recoverable for a breach 
unless: 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable fore-
cast of the just compensation for the harm that 
is caused by the ·breach. 
(b) The hann that is caused by the breach 
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is one that is incapable or very difficult of accu-
rate estimation.'' 
The cases staJte that the compensation so fixed must 
be reasonaJble ·at the time of the execution of the contract. 
That the contract in the present case was a lump sum price 
for real estate, house and personal property. 'Tilat the par-
ties to the.contract could reasonably forecast that a breach 
of the ~ntract would cause the sellers to be damages 41 the 
amount fixed as the stipulated ~orfeiture. That the down 
payment was less than 25% of the total purchase price. 
That if you determine that the said plaintiffs were in pos-
session for a period in excess of two years, the total per-
sentage would ~be 12:Y2 %. Thus we see that the amount 
fiixed is a reasonably forecast of the just compensation for 
the ·harm that was caused ·by the breach. 
Another rule or construction as laid down in American 
Law Reports, Annotated, 6 ALR 2d, at page 1429, is as fol-
lows: 
''The rule of construction that if the actual daniages 
probably resulting from a breach of a contract are un-
certain in amount and difficult to ascertain or prove, 
a provision in the contract as to the payment of a 
designated sum upon a breach will prima facie be .con-
strued as one for liquidated damages." 
That in our case this principle would apply inasmuch 
as the kinds and classes of property are different and that 
the actual ascertainment of damages cannot definitely be 
ascertained. 
The plaintiffs herein being the purchasers of the prop-
erty defaulted in the payment of the instalments and made 
no effort at all to continue on with the contract. The plain-
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7 
tiffs did not return all the personal property listed on the 
contract to the defendants herein. That the plaintiffs do 
not come into Court with clean hands to assert their rights. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
D·EFENDANTS A NEW TRIAL. 
The defendants herein at the conclusion of the trial 
moved for a new trial based upon Rule 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure based upon the following grounds: 
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes; provided however, that 
on a motion for a ne wtri·al in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judg-
ment if one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclu~ 
sions of law or make new findings and conclu-
sions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
( 4) Newly discovered evidence, material 
for the party making the application, 
which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produce 
at the trial. 
( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to jus-
tify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against the law.'' 
The defendants filed an affidavit made by a person well 
acquainted wirth the price of favm ground in the vicinity 
of the Hamilton farm. That at the time of trial the defend-. 
ant did not know or with diligence could not guard against 
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the possibility that said evidence would become material. 
That rtlhe evidence did not become material until after the 
Court had ruled on the case. 
The defendants further contend that no evidence at 
all was introduiced art the trial to justify the verdict. That 
in the evidence adduced at the trial there was nothing to 
justify the Court to ronstrue the forfeiture clause as a pen-
alty both in law and fact. 
CONCLUSION 
'Dhere is no justification in law or in fact for the find-
ings and decree of the Court, and the same should be re-
versed or remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN S. McALLISTER 
PAUL J. MERR~L 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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